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Abstract 
After having explored what is at stake in Berque’s efforts to overcome the pitfalls 
of a Western paradigm characterized by dualism between nature and culture and 
the conception of a substantial and abstract subject, I will show to what extent his 
notions of mesology and mediance help us think through the ecological crisis 
which cannot be reduced to issues such as global warming and the depletion of 
resources, but which concerns our perception of ourselves, our relationships with 
others and the meaning of our temporary stay on earth.  
 
The replacement of ecology by mesology leads to my own approach which is to 
make interaction with nature and other beings a chapter of a philosophy of 
existence that takes into account the materiality of our life, that is to say the fact 
that we live in and depend upon natural and cultural things such as water, food, 
river, trees, but also landscapes and towns. This phenomenology of nourishment 
highlights the corporality of the subject and insists upon the dimension of 
pleasure and enjoyment. The phenomenological description of eating, dwelling, 
walking, living in a place and being co-resident with other human and non-human 
existences, breathes new life into the concept of human existence. I shall further 
outline the political consequences of this phenomenology.  
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Thank you for giving me the opportunity to meet Augustin Berque. Not only does 
his conception of mediance and mesology refresh our understanding of our 
relationship with nature and our inhabiting the earth, but he also translated Fûdo 
of Watsuji (2011) and made it available to the French public. 
 
Berque and Watusji open the way to a new phenomenology that is characterized 
by the taking into account of spatiality. Nature is no longer an object nor 
something external to our life, as seen with the concept of trajection that higlights 
the co-institution of man and nature and the link between historicity and space.  
 
Moreover, human beings are no longer considered as individuals cut off from the 
ecological, cultural and technical milieu they live in and depend upon. This 
reinterpreting of our immersion in our milieu does not only aim at overcoming the 
dualism between nature and culture that prevents us from effective answers to the 
ecological crisis, it also affects the way we think of our relationship with others. 
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By reading Fûdo of Watsuji and by following Berque in his effort to overcome an 
abstract, substantial, disembodied conception of the subject, considered apart from 
the ecological, technical and cultural conditions of our existence, we pave the way 
for a phenomenology that is no longer focused on the individual dimension of 
existence. This is why it is new, compared to Heidegger’s understanding of the 
human condition, for instance in Being and Time (1927). 
 
We human beings live a dual existence. We have our personal life and endeavours, 
but our individual death is not the end of the world. The latter welcomes us when 
we are born and it will last after our individual deaths, as Arendt (1983: 95) said. 
This world, which is common to past, current and future generations, also entails 
cultural and natural beauty. Therefore ethics does not only concern individuals. In 
our daily life, when we are cold, or when we enjoy the summer, we are referring 
to the public world, to the traditions, to the habits and tools we have in common 
with other people. In a nutshell, instead of relying on an individualistic conception 
of our in-der-Welt-sein (Being in the world), such a phenomenology refreshes our 
understanding of our relationship with nature, our inhabiting the earth, our 
cohabitation with other human beings and other living beings, and the meaning of 
the word ‘world’. This is also what we find in the Japanese Ningen, which refers 
to the person, but also to the community. The same with yo no naka. Yo refers to 
aida, between, and naka, within (Watsuji 2003: 24). The conception of the human 
being as an individual (hito) is a fiction. 
 
I would like to further explore what is at stake in Berque’s efforts to overcome the 
pitfalls of a Western paradigm that comes from modernity. This paradigm is 
characterized by the dualism I mentioned above and the conception of a 
substantial and abstract subject. These pitfalls have a twofold dimension since 
they are theoretical and practical, that is to say that they have ecological, social, 
existential and political consequences. Berque insisted very clearly in his lecture 
on the theoretical aspect of his critique of the modern paradigm. I will insist on 
the practical aspects. 
 
The point is not only to underscore the dramatic consequences of a dualistic line 
of thought but rather to show to what extent Berque’s notions of mesology and 
mediance renew our understanding of our inhabiting the earth. Could these 
notions help us think through the ecological and social crisis? We have to 
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acknowledge that such a crisis is also a crisis of subjectivity, that is to say that it 
concerns our perception of ourselves, our way of inhabiting the earth, our 
relationships with the others and the meaning of our temporary stay on earth. It 
cannot be simply reduced to issues such as global warming, the depletion of 
resources and biodiversity, although these issues are looming challenges. I think 
that Berque’s approach can help us to better understand the ecological crisis we 
are confronted with. I will try to say why. In the second part, I will say a few 
words on my own phenomenological approach, which I have developed in several 
books, especially in Les Nourritures. Philosophie du corps politique (2015).  
 
2. Mediance, mesology, trajection, ecumene and chora in Berque 
 
The lecture Berque gave contains some of the ideas already developed in his 
books, such as Écoumène (2000). He also insisted on the lessons we can borrow 
from the Japanese language and its ternary structure that does not permit taking 
nature as an object and man as a subject (or a cogito) considered as a substance 
independent from the conditions that enable us to live (from space, for instance, 
and more precisely from our milieu, that is to say from a cultural, social, technical, 
spatial and historical Umwelt or fûdo we live in). 
 
Unlike the concept of environment, Umbegung, (shinzen kankyo), the concept of 
fûdo, Umwelt, means that we constitute it as much as it constitutes us. Our 
predicates, that is to say our customs, our representations frame fûdo. Conversely, 
our identity and our history are framed by it. The word ‘trajection’ conveys such 
co-institution, which also implies that contingence plays an important part. This 
has nothing to do with any conception of a rooted self whose identity would be 
defined by the soil and the blood. Berque’s notion of trajection avoids the 
nationalistic trend we can sometimes find in the Kyôto School. This is why his 
insistence upon the ternary structure of the Japanese language which avoids 
subjectivism as well as reductionism is very important. 
 
To illustrate the overcoming of any dualism between nature/culture, subject/object, 
we could refer to the notion of landscape, which implies our considering the 
climate, the soil, but also the fact that a landscape refers to the person who sees 
and contemplates it, as seen in paintings. The objective and the subjective 
dimensions of the landscape go hand in hand with one another (Besse 2009). 
 What Does It Mean to Replace Ecology with Mesology 
and Resources with Nourishment? 
 
 − 147 − 
However, my aim is not to repeat Berque. My goal is rather to show why his work 
could help us think through the ecological crisis by reframing it as an existential 
crisis, whereas other approaches in environmental ethics have failed. For this, we 
have to notice that the replacement of ecology by mesology is a consequence of the 
introduction of the notion of mediance (mesos, medietas). The overcoming of the 
dualism between nature and culture requires also the rejection of the understanding 
of freedom we find in Descartes and Kant till Rawls. These thinkers consider 
freedom as an overcoming of nature. The human being is for them an empire in an 
empire, as Spinoza said (1994). The world is separated from nature and the part 
geography plays in history is not acknowledged since history and politics are seen 
as if they only refer to human beings and nations. This is acosmism. 
 
Not only does this acosmism have theoretical and epistemological drawbacks, 
not only does it prevent us from respecting nature as the condition of our 
freedom, it also prevents us from providing relevant guidelines that would help 
us deal with the challenges we are confronted with. Lastly, it explains why 
environmental ethicists failed. 
 
The latter did not succeed in fostering individuals to make the changes in their 
lifestyles that are required to reduce their ecological footprint. For the same 
reason, they did not manage to make ecology a political platform. The reason for 
such failure is the following: in spite of their critique of anthropocentrism and 
their efforts to grant moral consideration to other living beings, or even to grant 
nature a non instrumental value, they shared a dualistic approach with the same 
philosophy of the subject they had rejected. 
 
The philosophy of the subject that still underlies the social contract from Hobbes 
to Rawls insists upon an atomistic conception of the self and upon (negative) 
freedom. This line of thought still characterizes Heidegger’s Being and Time 
(2010). For this philosophy, freedom is all important and nature is just a 
trampoline for human projects. On the contrary, for environmental ethicists, 
especially for those who pertain to eco-centrism, such as Leopold (1949), nature is 
all important. The point of departure of ecological politics is the acknowledgment 
of ecological norms such as the reduction of demography or the acceptance of the 
intrinsic value of ecosystems, as seen in Arne Næss (2013: 85). However, by 
doing so, environmental ethicists beg the question: these norms are easily accepted 
 Inter Faculty, vol. 7, FRAGMENTATION AND DIVERGENCE 
 
 − 148 − 
by ecologists, but they cannot enable us to reach an overlapping consensus and to 
define public policies in a pluralistic democracy. Moreover, nothing has changed 
in our lifestyles, even when it is acknowledged that ecosystems have a non-
instrumental value and that animals are not machines (Pelluchon 2011). 
 
Environmental ethics and animal ethics deal with the moral, if not legal, status of 
non-human beings and ecosystems and borrow from such studies some criteria 
that enable a denunciation of humankind’s exploitation of nature and animals. I 
think that the ethical and political failure of animal and environmental ethicists is 
due to their point of departure: they start with the other beings instead of 
considering that nature and animals belong to our lives and that politics is a 
cosmopolitics and a zoopolitics. On the contrary, when we study ecology as a 
chapter of a philosophy of existence, which is the approach fostered by Berque’s 
notion of mesology, we can pave the way for an ethics which can provide 
guidelines for fostering respect for nature and animals as well. Ecology can no 
longer be a separated field, but it is part of a philosophy of existence. This is 
already the bridge to my own work in The Nourritures (2015). It was actually my 
point of departure. 
 
To make the interaction with nature and other beings a chapter of a philosophy of 
existence is at stake in the replacement of ecology by mesology. It drove me to 
taking seriously the materiality of our existence, that is to say the fact that we live 
in and depend upon natural and cultural things, such as water, food, river, trees, 
but also bridges, landscapes and towns. 
 
Such an approach leads also to a reassessment of the meaning of architecture, as 
Berque says. To live somewhere is to feel at ease in a place which is not used to 
“park people” as if they were cars, as Illich (2005) noticed by using a metaphor to 
describe the loss of common sense in urban areas.  By the same token, we cannot 
consider that space is only a topos, that is to say a geometric space. The oblivion 
of chora which conveys, as in Plato, the idea of the genesis stands for this 
acosmism which leads to building places where it is not possible to live well and 
to feel at home (Derrida 1993). 
 
 
 What Does It Mean to Replace Ecology with Mesology 
and Resources with Nourishment? 
 
 − 149 − 
Lastly, when Watsuji (2011) says that mediance is “the structural moment of 
human existence”, he suggests that we are never alone. To live is to live with the 
others, to experience the aida (Pelluchon 2015: 85).There is a very beautiful 
passage in Fûdo, in which Watsuji (2011) describes the experience of being cold. 
When I am cold, I do not aim at the cold. It is not an object nor a noem. We can 
no longer understand such a phenomenon as if it were the result of our 
intentionality. This means that the phenomenology we use is different from the 
one we find in Husserl. It is no longer a phenomenology of the constitution, as I 
say in Les Nourritures (2015: 91-92), quoting Levinas who put into crisis the 
representation by describing phenomena that escape our intentionality (such as 
pain, growing old and so on). Moreover, when I am cold or when it is raining, I 
am always referring to the others since I wear a pullover or take an umbrella. Our 
daily life, that is to say the description of our existence in its materiality, points 
out that the subject is no longer to be understood in light of Descartes’s cogito 
ergo sum. The self is always relational and embodied. Moreover, in the Japanese 
language, the subject is always situational. Berque shows us that such a way of 
thinking does not fit any objective statement. I would add that it fits phenomenology, 
which is neither reductionist nor subjectivist. 
 
3. The phenomenology of nourishment and its political consequences 
 
Let me develop this idea by referring to my own work which is in tune with that 
of both Berque and Watsuji. Like Berque, I try to overcome the dualism between 
nature and culture and other relying dualisms (object/subject, mind/body, 
reason/emotion). I also focus on spatiality and not only on time. However, my 
specific contribution to an understanding of human existence considered in its 
materiality is to highlight the corporality of the subject, which takes place in a 
phenomenology of the non-constitution whose paradigm is the nourishment. We 
shall see what is at stake in the description of eating but also in the replacement of 
resources by nourishment. 
 
I am also in tune with Watsuji since he tried to substitute Heidegger’s ontology 
and his Sein zum Tode, another understanding of the human condition which 
insists on the dual dimension of our existence and which goes hand in hand with 
the primacy of life over death, replacing our obsession for our individual deaths 
by the commitment to preserve the common world from destruction and to 
 Inter Faculty, vol. 7, FRAGMENTATION AND DIVERGENCE 
 
 − 150 − 
transmit it to future generations. I will draw the political consequences of such a 
phenomenology of nourishment, for which to live is to live in, and depend upon 
the world and to live with, and for the others. 
 
Nourishment is the word I use to speak of the natural and cultural things I live in 
and depend upon. It is a way of avoiding the word ‘resources’ that reduces the 
world and nature to tools and means to our ends, as in Heidegger. Not only do I 
highlight the environmental and social conditions of my existence, but I also insist 
upon the dimension of pleasure and enjoyment that is linked to our existence. The 
phenomenological description of eating, dwelling, walking, living in a place and 
being co-residents with other human and non-human animals, breathes new life 
into the concept of human existence. Not only is the subject embodied and 
dependent on natural and cultural things that nourish his or her life, giving it taste, 
the subject is also always relational. 
 
For sure, these things I live in and depend upon correspond to my needs, but I am 
immediately looking for the taste of food when I am eating. I eat in order to eat and 
to enjoy food, and not to live, as Levinas (1994) says. Existence is not understood 
in light of the struggle for life or the project as in Heidegger. Life is loved for 
itself. It is a pleasure to live, as seen with the young human and non-human babies 
who have pleasure in playing, as if life were more generous than what we imagine 
when referring to the plans of life, to the projects. (Pelluchon 2015: 43). We might 
have forgotten this originary love for life, but dereliction is originary only in a 
philosophy for which my individual death is the end of the world and whose 
obsession for power leads to overvalue Entschlossenheit - resolution. I think that 
Watusji understood this very well. 
 
The nourishment, the natural and cultural things I live in and depend upon, are not 
objects nor noems. Not only do I incorporate them, but they nourish my life. They 
give it meaning and taste. Such a phenomenology of nourishment highlights the 
corporality of the subject, the fact consciousness is not the sole origin of the 
meaning and that our body is the starting point of our experience of the world which 
is an immersion in the sensitive world. It corresponds to my needs, but it also 
pleases me. This is why eating is the paradigm of this philosophy of sensations 
that describes our being with the world and makes aesthetics enter ethics. 
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The description of eating shows that we are always connected to current, past and 
future persons and with other animals, since our consumption has an impact on 
them. When I am eating, I am never alone, even if nobody shares my bread, 
because my lifestyles and habits have an impact upon the other human and non-
human beings. I foster this or that production and distribution, this or that kind of 
agriculture and breeding. While eating, I am also connected to people living in 
poor countries where many suffer from hunger or malnutrition. We know that the 
growing demand for meat explains why cereals produced in Africa are sold for 
American or European cattle, not to mention the use of land for cotton or any 
other product sold to rich countries. Instead of fostering local agricultures, the 
rules of the market explain in part that about one billion people are still starving to 
death, whereas two billion are suffering from malnutrition. Famine is not an issue 
of shortage - a technical problem that could be solved by increasing the 
production of food with pesticides and GMOs, it is a matter of justice. This 
phenomenology of eating goes hand in hand with an inquiry into the meaning of 
agriculture and its role in culture (a phenomenology of agriculture). Likewise, the 
way I try to politicize the question of animal welfare leads to speak of justice 
towards animals and this goes further than issues concerning their rights. 
 
When I am eating, I state the importance I leave to other human and non-human 
beings. I state whether they have the right to live and to flourish. Ethics is not a 
normative discipline, but it is a matter of self-limitation.  Ethics refers to the limits 
I set upon my right to use whatever is good for my own preservation for the sake 
of future and current persons and animals. Therefore, ethics does not begin with 
the encounter with the other’s face. Not only is it extended to future generations 
and animals, but it also makes sense once I eat. This way of stressing the ethical 
dimension of eating cannot be found in Levinas (1994) who instead thinks that 
there is a break between enjoyment and justice, between my immersion in the 
sensitive world and ethics that starts with the encounter of the other human being. 
 
Eating is a statement. It has an affective, social and cultural dimension, but also an 
ethical and political one. Ethics makes sense once I am eating, since my lifestyles 
show whether I am prone to set limits on my right to use whatever pleases me for 
the sake of other human and non-human beings. Likewise, birth is a structure of 
existence that does not prove our facticity, as in Heidegger (2010), but instead  
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installs inter-subjectivity inside the subject. Lastly, to live is to share space and 
nourishment with other human beings, but also with other animals, whose 
existence puts me into question and raises issues of justice. 
 
The description of other structures of existence (dwelling, to live somewhere and 
then to coexist, to be born) shows that the subject is always relational. In my life, 
there are the lives of the others, be they my ancestors or future generations who 
will bear the burden of global warming and climate change. Justice is not 
essentially understood as the fair allocation of resources, but the principles of a 
theory of justice as sharing nourishment, taking into account the interests of future 
generations, the irreversibility of some technologies (such as nuclear energy), the 
ethological norms of animals which set limits to our right to use and abuse them, 
and the right of any being to have access to food and water. 
 
In a nutshell, the embodied and relational subject, which refers in my last book 
(Pelluchon 2015: 44-52, 72-74) to “the gourmand cogito” and “the born cogito”, 
renews the meaning of ethics and justice and our inhabiting the earth and it leads to 
replace the philosophy of the subject that still grounds political liberalism in another 
conception of our being-with-the-world-and-the-other which has far-reaching 
political implications. This creates the link between the first part of the book (A 
phenomenology of nourishment) and the second (Establishing a common world). 
 
Starting from eating, I draw the political implications of this philosophy of 
corporality. The social contract can no longer be understood as in Hobbes, Locke, 
Rousseau or Rawls, who ground their political theories upon an abstract, 
individualistic and more or less disembodied subject, whose freedom is only 
limited by the freedom of other current human beings. Such a political frame 
cannot help us answer the ecological crisis, which is not reduced to depletion of 
resources and biodiversity, but refers to a crisis of the subjectivity and our being-
with-others. I try to provide guidelines that aim at reconstructing democracy so 
that ecology, the alleviation of animal suffering, but also conviviality may enter 
politics, supplementing representative democracy with a non-representative 
system and indicating the conditions of an evolution from a competitive 
democracy towards a more deliberate model that could also make citizens take 
part in decision-making. 
 
 What Does It Mean to Replace Ecology with Mesology 
and Resources with Nourishment? 
 
 − 153 − 
Such an embodied, relational subject provides the philosophical foundation for 
another political theory in which the goals of the State can no longer be reduced 
to security and the reduction of unfair inequalities. The protection of the finite 
biosphere, the alleviation of animal suffering, the concern for future generations 
and the consideration of all the dimensions that enable us to flourish, and not 
only to survive, frame a new social contract which corresponds to the normative 
aspect of such an ambitious political theory, which we could compare to the 
work of an architect: whereas the phenomenology of nourishment stands for the 
foundations and plays the part that the fiction of a natural state played in 
Rousseau ([1762] 2001), The Social Contract, which establishes the criteria of 
politics and is linked to a theory of justice (with nine principles), represents the pillar. 
Lastly, the chapters that deal with the conditions of a reconstruction of democracy 
and refer to institutional but also cultural innovations that could enable us fulfil 




My contribution to the current debates on landscape and environment does not 
pertain to environmental ethics. I rather develop an ontology that has nothing to 
do with Heidegger’s ontology of Sorge. Such a phenomenology of nourishment 
renews the meaning of our being-with-the-world-and-with-the-others. I then draw 
the political consequences of such philosophy, advocating a reconstruction of 
politics and even democracy. I know that such an enterprise is very ambitious, but 
I was lucky to read such an inspirational thinker as Berque, whom again I thank 
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